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A B S T R A C T
This paper identiﬁes and evaluates the explicit and implicit philosophical assumptions underlying the so-called
multilevel perspective on sociotechnical transitions (MLP). These include assumptions about the nature of reality
(ontology), the status of claims about that reality (epistemology) and the appropriate choice of research methods
The paper assesses the consistency of these assumptions with the philosophical tradition of critical realism and
uses this tradition to highlight a number of potential weaknesses of the MLP. These include: the problematic
conception of social structure and the misleading priority given to intangible rules; the tendency to use theory as
a heuristic device rather than causal explanation; the ambition to develop an extremely versatile framework
rather than testing competing explanations; the relative neglect of the necessity or contingency of particular
causal mechanisms; and the reliance upon single, historical case studies with insuﬃcient use of comparative
methods. However, the paper also concludes that the ﬂexibility of the MLP allows room for reconciliation, and
provides some suggestions on how that could be achieved – including proposing an alternative, critical realist
interpretation of sociotechnical systems.
1. Introduction
Research in innovation studies is increasingly focused on the chal-
lenge of sustainability − and in particular, the threat posed by climate
change. Given the scale of this challenge, it is clear that an eﬀective
response will require more than developing and adopting cleaner
technologies. Instead, major changes will be required in multiple as-
pects of the energy, transport, food and other systems that form the
basis of industrialised societies. Innovation research has therefore fo-
cused increasingly upon how these systems function and how they may
undergo far-reaching change (Van den Bergh et al., 2011). The growing
literature on these so-called ‘sociotechnical transitions’ has a range of
antecedents and takes a variety of forms, but has increasingly coalesced
around a particular theoretical framework: the so-called multilevel per-
spective on sociotechnical transitions (MLP) (Geels, 2002a).
The MLP seeks to explain highly complex, non-linear processes that
unfold over many decades, involve multiple social groups and technical
artefacts; have unclear boundaries in space and time and lead to un-
certain and contingent outcomes. It seeks to track changes in complex
systems along several dimensions; and to explain those changes as the
result of the alignment and mutual reinforcement of a variety of pro-
cesses operating at a number of levels. To identify those processes, the
MLP draws upon a large and growing range of social scientiﬁc theories,
several of which employ diﬀerent and potentially incompatible
foundational assumptions (e.g. evolutionary economics and the social
construction of technology). This theoretical development informs and
is informed by a series of qualitative, historical case studies that typi-
cally focus upon single rather than comparative cases and rely primarily
upon secondary data (e.g. Geels, 2002a, 2006a).
Since its inception in the early 2000s, the MLP has proved en-
ormously successful, attracting interest from researchers from a wide
range of disciplines and stimulating a wealth of theoretical develop-
ments and empirical applications.1 The policy implications of this work
have proved more diﬃcult to identify and to communicate, but initial
success in the Netherlands (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2010) has been
followed by broader interest, including from the OECD (OECD, 2015;
EEA, 2016).
Given this range of activity, it is increasingly diﬃcult to keep track
of developments and to assess the contribution that the MLP has made.
In this context, this paper seeks to take a step back. Instead of applying
the MLP to new empirical topics or ‘enriching’ it with new theoretical
ideas, the paper seeks to identify and evaluate the philosophical as-
sumptions that underpin the MLP. These include the explicit or implicit
assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology) and the status of
knowledge claims about that reality (epistemology), together with the
corresponding recommendations for research methodology. These as-
sumptions are insuﬃciently discussed by practitioners or users of MLP-
based research, and deserve more consideration.
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To achieve this, the paper introduces a particular philosophy of
science, known as critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 2014). Although
widely used within the social sciences, critical realism has had little
inﬂuence upon innovation studies. In crude terms, critical realism seeks
to bridge some long-standing divisions within the social sciences −
such as between positivism and interpretivism. More technically, cri-
tical realism combines an ‘ontological realism’ (the claim that phe-
nomena exist independently of our knowledge of them) with ‘episte-
mological relativism’ (the claim that human knowledge is socially
produced, historically transient and fallible) and ‘judgemental ration-
alism’ (the claim that there are rational grounds for preferring some
theories and explanations over others). (Bhaskar, 1975). From a critical
realist perspective, the primary objective of social scientiﬁc research is
not to predict or to interpret but to explain− in other words, to develop
empirically supported theories and hypotheses about how, why and
under what conditions particular phenomena occur. Good explanations
will include reference to: the (real) physical and social entities that are
considered to be relevant; the relationships between the constituent
parts of those entities; the causal powers that result from those re-
lationships; and the contingent combinations of entities and powers
that are responsible for particular events (Elder-Vass, 2010). Humean
models of causation that rely solely upon correlations between observed
events do not meet these explanatory criteria (Lawson, 1997). Neither
do they the ‘as if’2; models proposed by some economists or the
‘heuristic devices’3; proposed by some sociologists (Lawson, 1997).
The paper argues that critical realism can help to clarify some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the MLP, including the validity of claims
about the nature and properties of sociotechnical systems, the appro-
priate criteria for justifying those claims and the relative usefulness of
diﬀerent research methods. Since the MLP is not a homogeneous body
of thought, the paper focuses primarily on the work of the leading
author in the ﬁeld− Frank Geels− who has gone further than most in
discussing the philosophical foundations of the MLP (e.g. Geels, 2010,
2009). However, the paper is also informed by the broader MLP lit-
erature, including studies that have been more critical of its core as-
sumptions (Genus and Coles, 2008; Markard and Truﬀer, 2008; Shove
and Walker, 2007).
The paper organises the evaluation of the MLP around six issues,
namely:
1. the distinction between sociotechnical systems and sociotechnical
regimes;
2. the conception of social structure and the priority given to ‘rules’;
3. the deﬁnition and boundaries of sociotechnical systems and regimes;
4. the status of the MLP as a ‘heuristic device’;
5. the necessity or contingency of particular causal mechanisms; and
6. the validity of narrative explanation.
The ﬁrst three of these are ontological while the remainder are
epistemological and/or methodological. In each case, the paper high-
lights inconsistencies between the nature and application of the MLP
and the philosophy of critical realism and uses this to highlight some
limitations of the MLP. But the paper also suggests that the ﬂexibility of
the MLP allows room for reconciliation, and provides some suggestions
on how that could be achieved.
At the time of submitting this paper, there had been no previous
evaluation of the MLP from the perspective of critical realism. But
during the review process, Svensson and Nikoleris (2018) published a
critical realist critique of the ontological foundations of the MLP, fo-
cusing in particular on the conception of social structure. As such,
Svensson and Nikoleris primarily address point 2 above, although they
also make a number of comments on methodology. Their insightful
critique is entirely consistent with the arguments that follow, so the two
papers should be regarded as complementary. A number of references
to Svensson and Nikoleris have therefore been included in what follows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of the MLP, illustrating its basic insights and claims
with the help of a practical example and summarising its three core
analytical concepts − niche, regime and landscape. Section 3 provides
an introduction to critical realism, highlighting key ideas such as the
concept of emergence. Section 4 identiﬁes the implicit ontology of the
MLP and indicates a number of important diﬃculties, including: the
lack of clarity in deﬁning sociotechnical systems and sociotechnical
regimes; the problematic attribution of causal priority to the regime;
and the reliance upon a theory of social structure (structuration) that
eﬀectively conﬂates structure and agency and downplays the im-
portance of social relations. Section 5 does the same for epistemology
and methodology, and highlights the tensions between the use of MLP
as a heuristic device and as a causal explanation, the lack of attention to
the necessity or contingency of diﬀerent causal mechanisms and the
limitations of ‘narrative explanation’ and ‘process theory’ as a model for
MLP-based research. Section 6 summarises the key ﬁndings and brieﬂy
suggests how future research could address some of these limitations.
2. Sociotechnical systems and transitions
The MLP begins with the observation that ‘societal functions’, such
as personal transport, electronic communication, water supply and
housing are provided by a cluster of interlinked social and technical
entities4 that are collectively termed a sociotechnical system (Geels,
2002a). Relevant entities include technologies, ﬁrms, supply chains,
infrastructures, markets and regulations. Sociotechnical systems de-
velop over many decades and the alignment and co-evolution of the
diﬀerent entities and practices leads to mutual dependence and re-
sistance to change (Geels, 2002a, 2012; Geels et al., 2012). However,
the primary source of stability in these systems is claimed to be the
shared rules, norms, expectations and beliefs that guide the behaviour
of the diﬀerent actors within the system − termed the sociotechnical
regime. Sociotechnical transitions are deﬁned as major transformations in
these regimes/systems. These typically involve major changes in the
technologies that form the core of the system, but they also − and
necessarily − involve interlinked changes in many other parts of the
system, together with far-reaching changes in the underlying rules and
norms (the regime).
To make these ideas more concrete, take the example of the car-
based transport system providing the societal function of personal
mobility (Geels et al., 2012; Sorrell, 2015). This system is centred on an
individual artefact − the car- but this artefact is linked to and depen-
dent upon multiple social and technical entities at a variety of levels.
These include, but are not conﬁned to: the global car industry and its
many associated supply chains; the car maintenance and distribution
network; the global oil industry and the associated infrastructure of oil
wells, reﬁneries, pipelines and fuel stations; the road infrastructure and
associated industries; the patterns of land use that have developed
around that infrastructure, including amenities and workplaces that are
only accessible by car; the multiple institutions, regulations and policies
associated with the production and use of cars; the engineering skills
and knowledge built up over decades in a variety of domains; the
2 Exempliﬁed by the following statement by Milton Friedman "… Consider the problem
of predicting the shots made by an expert billiard player. It seems not at all unreasonable
that excellent predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard player
made his shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give the
optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc., describing
the location of the balls, could make lightning calculations from the formulas, and could
then make the balls travel in the direction indicated by the formulas.…" (Friedman, 1953)
3 "… This signiﬁes a concept or idea that is used not so much because it is well sup-
ported by the evidence but because it helps us think about the problem…"(Bruce and
Yearley, 2006)
4 The generic term 'entity' is not commonly used within the MLP literature, but is used
here to facilitate comparison with critical realism.
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technical associations, interest groups and other organisations that are
active in these domains; the daily travel routines, behaviour and ex-
pectations of millions of car owners; and the symbolism and cultural
norms that have become associated with car-based mobility (‘car cul-
ture’) (Unruh, 2000). These diﬀerent entities and practices coevolve
and act together to shape the level and pattern of personal mobility, as
well as the environmental impacts of that mobility (Sorrell, 2015).
While individual entities within the car-based transport system are
constantly undergoing incremental change, a transition to a more sus-
tainable transport system is likely to require multiple entities and
practices to undergo more radical change− such as the substitution of
internal combustion engines by battery-electric motors, the replace-
ment of petroleum infrastructures with electrical charging infra-
structures, the development of industries and supply chains for batteries
and other technologies (along with the decline of existing industries
and supply chains), the integration of the transport system with smart
electrical grids that may use electric vehicles for electricity storage, the
development of new knowledge and skills within each of these areas
and the adjustment of users to vehicles that perform diﬀerently, are
recharged diﬀerently, have a shorter range and may no longer be in-
dividually owned (Geels et al., 2012). Hence, an improved under-
standing of how such radical transitions have occurred in the past could
potentially inform eﬀorts to transform existing systems in more sus-
tainable directions (Smith et al., 2005, 2010; Geels and Loorbach, 2010;
Schot and Geels, 2008; Markard et al., 2012).
Geels (2002b,c, 2004) and other authors (Unruh, 2000; Kemp,
1994; Hughes, 1987; Kemp et al., 2001) have described how socio-
technical systems evolve and become established, how they encourage
incremental change along predictable trajectories and how their stabi-
lity can obstruct more radical change. Sociotechnical systems fre-
quently rest upon core technologies such as the internal combustion
engine whose early evolution involves considerable uncertainty. His-
torical experience suggests that (contrary to the predictions of orthodox
economics) apparently inferior technologies can become dominant
when they obtain an early advantage that allows them to beneﬁt from
various positive feedback mechanisms − such as scale economies that
reduce costs, lower prices and encourage increased demand; learning
economies that improve product performance, increase product at-
tractiveness and further reduce costs; and network economies that en-
hance value through the development of complementary goods and
services (Unruh, 2000; Arthur, 1989, 1994; Sterman, 2000). As core
technologies diﬀuse, other factors come in to play to reinforce their
dominant position, such as: investments in supporting infrastructure
(e.g. roads, pipelines, garages); increased knowledge and capabilities in
relevant areas (e.g. motor engineering); the growing economic and
political power of relevant groups (e.g. the car industry); the estab-
lishment of supportive organisations and institutional frameworks (e.g.
professional institutions, labour unions, regulations); and the evolving
habits, norms and aspirations of diﬀerent consumer groups (Unruh,
2000). These interdependent and co-evolving entities combine to form
economically signiﬁcant and geographically extensive systems that
becomes increasingly entrenched or locked-in, making it diﬃcult for
technologies and behaviours that diverge in various ways from the
dominant system (e.g. electric or fuel cell vehicles, mass transit) to
become established (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1990).
The MLP aims to understand: the nature, characteristics and modes
of functioning of these sociotechnical systems; the sources of inertia in
those systems; the conditions under which those systems change; and,
in particular, the processes through which transitions to diﬀerent so-
ciotechnical systems come about. To do so, the MLP combines ideas
from evolutionary economics (e.g., variation and selection, path de-
pendence, lock-in), science and technology studies (e.g. actor-networks,
social construction of technology) and various traditions within so-
ciology (e.g. structuration, social practices, social expectations).
Informed by a series of historical case studies (e.g. Geels, 2004,
2005a,b, 2006b), the MLP explains radical change as the result of
interactions between three levels, namely: the system itself which may
be encountering internal diﬃculties (or more speciﬁcally the rules and
norms that guide the actors in the system, namely the sociotechnical
regime); the ‘niches’ in which radical innovations are being developed;
and the exogenous socio-economic ‘landscape’ that is imposing pres-
sures upon the system. These are brieﬂy elaborated below:
• Regime: As indicated, the incumbent sociotechnical system refers to
the dominant technologies, infrastructures, industries, supply chains
and organisations associated with delivering a particular societal
function. The actions of the social groups that create and reproduce
these systems are inﬂuenced by rules, shared meanings, rules of
thumb, routines and social norms. These more intangible elements
are collectively termed the sociotechnical regime (Geels, 2002b,
2004) − although as discussed in Section 4, there is ambiguity and
inconsistency in the use of these terms. The regime is claimed to
provide orientation and coordination to the activities of diﬀerent
social groups which, together with the social relationships between
these groups, provides the primary source of the stability of socio-
technical systems. Innovation in existing systems is mostly incre-
mental and path dependent, owing to ‘lock-in’ eﬀects such as sunk
investments, economies of scale, vested interests, design standards
and entrenched social norms. Taken together, these features make
sociotechnical systems stable and resistant to change. However, over
time it is possible that tensions will build up within a system that are
diﬃcult to resolve through incremental change and which begin to
threaten its stability. For example, the car-based and oil-based
transport system may be threatened by growing congestion and
worsening urban air quality.
• Niche: At any time there are typically several emerging technologies
that diﬀer in important respects from those dominant within the
incumbent sociotechnical system (e.g. battery-electric vehicles, hy-
drogen fuel cells, autonomous vehicles). These ‘niche innovations’
usually perform poorly compared to the established technologies,
are relatively expensive and ﬁnd it diﬃcult to compete (Schot and
Geels, 2008; Geels, 2002b, 2004). In addition, they may lack ap-
propriate infrastructure, encounter resistance from potential users
and be obstructed by existing regulations. But such innovations may
be able to gain a foothold within particular applications, geo-
graphical areas or markets, or with the assistance of targeted policy
interventions. As with regimes, niche innovations are created and
reproduced by social groups working with shared rules, but in
contrast to the dominant regime the relevant social networks are
fragile and unstable and the rules are malleable and contested −
often with several competing technologies, designs and visions.
Niche innovations frequently fail, but in some circumstances can
gain enough momentum to stabilise their conﬁgurations, improve
their performance, reduce their cost, achieve more widespread
adoption and trigger changes in other system elements. This re-
quires a growing consensus amongst relevant social groups about
the appropriate conﬁguration and market potential of the relevant
innovations, together with increased access to ﬁnancial, political
and other resources (Kemp et al., 1998; Hoogma, 2002). Under these
conditions, the niche has the potential to ‘break through’ and to
challenge the existing regime.
• Landscape: The evolution of sociotechnical systems may be aﬀected
in various ways by the broader physical, political and economic
environment or landscape (Geels, 2002b, 2004). The landscape is
largely beyond the control of the actors within the system, but it
may inﬂuence the system through either gradual changes, such as
shifts in cultural preferences, demographics, and macro-political
developments, or through short-term shocks such as economic re-
cessions. For example, rising oil prices and growing concerns about
climate change are exerting pressure on the car-based transport
system.
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Case studies of previous sociotechnical transitions5 suggest that
niche innovations can break through when their growing internal mo-
mentum combines with increasing tensions within the existing socio-
technical system and growing pressures on that system from the external
landscape. In combination, these create ‘windows of opportunity’ for
radical change. These changes go beyond the adoption of new tech-
nologies and include investment in new infrastructures, the establish-
ment of new markets, the development of new social preferences and
the adjustment of user practices and routines. These case studies in-
dicate how, in the context of landscape pressure and internal tensions,
successful niche innovations can trigger a series of inter-related tech-
nical, economic, social and cultural changes that may eventually
combine to create a new and diﬀerent sociotechnical system based
around a diﬀerent set of core technologies (see Fig. 1).
Since the initial application of this framework by Geels (2004), it
has been developed and elaborated in multiple ways. For example, al-
though the narrative of niche-driven transitions remains dominant, the
framework has been reﬁned to incorporate a broader range of ‘transi-
tion pathways’ that diﬀer in the nature and timing of the interactions
between the three levels (Geels and Schot, 2007). Other authors have
highlighted divergences from the standard ‘niche breakthrough model’,
including niche activities being driven by incumbents (Berggren et al.,
2015), the importance of technological complementarities (Markard
and Hoﬀmann, 2016) and the co-evolution of diﬀerent regimes
(Papachristos et al., 2013; Raven, 2007). More recently there have been
attempts to better integrate power and politics into the MLP (Smith
et al., 2005; Kern and Markard, 2016; Meadowcroft, 2009; Avelino and
Rotmans, 2009; Geels, 2014) and to better reﬂect the spatial dimension
of transitions (Coenen et al., 2012; Murphy, 2015; Calvert et al., 2017).
The MLP has informed an enormous amount of empirical research,6
but much of this has focused upon emerging niche innovations and the
challenge of steering future transitions in more sustainable directions
(Smith et al., 2005; Geels and Loorbach, 2010; Smith et al., 2010;
Markard et al., 2012; Verbong and Geels, 2010), rather than explaining
the sources and dynamics of historical transitions or critiquing existing
accounts of those transitions. Authors using the MLP have also in-
troduced an increasing number of theoretical ideas, partly to compen-
sate for perceived weaknesses with the original framework and to better
explain particular transition processes, but also to reﬂect their parti-
cular disciplinary perspectives. The result is a highly complex and ever-
growing theoretical framework that is claimed to be applicable to a
wide range of systems, contexts and processes (see Section 6). But de-
spite these developments, the underlying ontological and epistemolo-
gical assumptions of the MLP have received little attention and remain
largely unchallenged. Before these can be assessed, it is ﬁrst necessary
to outline the core arguments of critical realism.
3. Critical realism
First developed by Bhaskar in the 1970s (Bhaskar, 1975, 2014),
critical realism7 is an inﬂuential philosophy of the natural and social
sciences that has informed empirical studies in a variety of areas
(Lawson, 1997; Danermark et al., 2001; Easton, 2010; Mingers, 2004;
McEvoy and Richards, 2003; Fleetwood, 1999; Fleetwood and Ackroyd,
2004; Blundel, 2007; Downward, 2005; Clark et al., 2007). As a phi-
losophy of science, critical realism cannot be used to assess the validity
of particular theoretical claims, but it can be used to evaluate the on-
tological and epistemological assumptions underlying those claims and
Fig. 1. Multilevel perspective on sociotechnical transitions.
source: (Geels, 2002a).
5 For example: sailing ships to steam ships (Geels, 2002b); propeller to turbojet aircraft
(Geels, 2006a), horse-drawn carriages to automobiles (Geels, 2005a), mixed farming to
intensive pig husbandry (Geels, 2009); and steam to electric power in factory organisation
(Geels, 2006b))
6 For example, by November 2017, a foundational paper by Geels (Geels, 2002a) had
received over 3100 citations on Google Scholar.
7 This section describes the ‘classic’ critical realism developed by Bhaskar in his ﬁrst
two books (Bhaskar, 1975; Bhaskar, 2014). Bhaskar subsequently developed ‘dialectical’
and ‘transcendental’ critical realism, but these ideas are far less accessible and have
correspondingly proved far less inﬂuential (Archer et al., 1999).
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the appropriate methodologies for investigating them. Adherents argue
that critical realism oﬀers a more persuasive account of the nature of
reality (ontology) and the status of knowledge claims about reality
(epistemology) than do competing philosophies of science (Table 1)
(Collier, 1994). Owing to lack of space, this claim will not be defended
here (readers should refer to Bhaskar’s original texts (Bhaskar, 1975;
Bhaskar, 2014) and subsequent elaborations by other authors (Elder-
Vass, 2010; Collier, 1994; Sayer, 1992; Porpora, 2015). Instead, the
subsequent sections will focus on the consistency between critical rea-
lism and the MLP, and what this says about the strengths and weak-
nesses of the MLP.
The following summary of critical realism is based upon the ac-
cessible introductions by Sayer (1992), Collier (1994), Porpora (2015)
and Danermark et al. (2001), and in particular the work of Elder Vass
(Elder-Vass, 2010, 2012b, 2012a; Archer and Elder-Vass, 2012). The
original motivating question for Bhaskar was: “what must the world be
like for science to be possible?” (Bhaskar, 1975). His answer was that
there must be an independently existing world of entities that have
causal powers and liabilities, or more generally causal properties, as a
consequence of the necessary relations between their constituent parts
(Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994). When these causal powers and liabilities
are triggered they act in combination to create events, some of which we
observe. The objective of science is to uncover the nature and structure
of these entities, to identify and explain their causal properties with
reference to their structure, and to use this understanding to explain
particular events in terms of contingent combinations of entities and
their associated properties. In the case of social events, these entities
include human beings with their power of conscious, reﬂective
thinking. Critical realism accepts that scientiﬁc knowledge is provi-
sional, fallible and historically relative (i.e. it accepts epistemic re-
lativism), but nevertheless argues that knowledge can progress and that
scientiﬁc methods can provide grounds for choosing between com-
peting claims (i.e. it rejects judgemental relativism) (Sayer, 1992).
Critical realism applies to both the natural and social sciences, although
the diﬀerences in the nature of the relevant entities leads to corre-
sponding diﬀerences in the status of knowledge claims and the appro-
priate choice of research methods (Bhaskar, 1975; Bhaskar, 2014).
A core distinction within critical realism is between the real, the
actual and the empirical (Collier, 1994; Sayer, 1992). The actual is those
events that occur in the world, while the empirical is the subset of events
that are actually observed. Lying behind these events is the domain of
the real which consists of entities of various forms. These entities may
be physical (e.g. minerals), biological (animals, people) or social (e.g.
families, organisations, markets, language groups) and they may or may
not be directly observed − although to support claims of their ex-
istence, their eﬀects must be observed. Individual entities have parti-
cular causal powers (the capacity to act in certain ways) and particular
liabilities (the susceptibility to particular types of change) as a
consequence of their internal structure. So for example, water has the
power to quench a ﬁre, aircraft have the power to ﬂy, a market has the
power to make eﬃcient use of resources and so on.
Individual entities are wholes formed from a set of parts (i.e. other
entities) that are related, or structured, in a particular way (Elder-Vass,
2010; Sayer, 1992). This structure ensures that the entity persists for a
period of time, as well as endowing it with its unique causal properties.
So for example, a university is formed from a number of other entities,
both material and social (e.g. departments, academics, buildings,
equipment, legal frameworks), whose structural relationships endow
the university with the power to recruit staﬀ, raise ﬁnance, conduct
research, teach students and award degrees. In turn, these constituent
entities are also internally structured and have their own causal prop-
erties.
The relationship between two or more entities may either be ne-
cessary or contingent. For example, there is a necessary relationship be-
tween a tenant and a landlord, since a person or organisation cannot be
a tenant in the absence of a landlord (Sayer, 1992).8 In contrast, al-
though the personal characteristics of the landlord may aﬀect the te-
nant in various ways, they are a contingent feature of their relationship
(Sayer, 1992). Structure may then be deﬁned as the set of necessary
relationships between the constituent parts of an entity.
When actualised, the causal properties of an entity will tend to bring
about certain events (Sayer, 1992). For example, when water is thrown
upon a ﬁre it will tend to put it out. But whether particular causal
powers are actualised, and whether or not they bring about particular
events, will depend upon a variety of other, contingent conditions −
such as the intensity of the ﬁre, the strength of the wind, the ﬂamm-
ability of the relevant materials, and so on. Depending upon the cir-
cumstances, the same causal power may lead to diﬀerent events (e.g.
the ﬁre may or may not be quenched), and the same event may result
from diﬀerent causal powers (e.g. the ﬁre may be quenched by CO2
rather than water). The same applies to the social realm, although here
the relevant entities are fundamentally diﬀerent in character (see
below). For example, a ﬁrm may tend to minimise costs as a con-
sequence of its internal structure, the roles assigned to its employees
and the incentives provided by the markets in which it operates. But
whether it minimises costs will depend upon the capacities, ideas, pro-
pensities and beliefs of its employees, the information and resources
available to them, the market structure and a range of other contingent
and contextual factors and inﬂuences.
Events in the world are typically the net result of the simultaneous
operation of multiple causal mechanisms associated with the contingent
combination of multiple entities. Hence, an invariant association be-
tween particular causal mechanisms and particular types of event may
Table 1
Competing philosophies of social science.
Source: Based on (Mingers, 2006).
Positivism Interpretivism Critical realism
Ontology Independent and objective reality Socially constructed reality Objective, stratiﬁed reality consisting of surface-level events and
real entities with particular structures and causal propertiesCausality indicated by constant
conjunctions of empirical events
Multiple realities possible
Epistemology Knowledge generated by discovering
general laws and relationships that have
predictive power
Knowledge generated by interpreting subjective
meanings and actions of subjects according to
their own frame of reference
‘Retroduction’ used to create theories about the entities, structures
and causal mechanisms that combine to generate observable
events
Emphasis on prediction Emphasis on interpretation Emphasis on explanation
Methodology Quantitative methods, such as
experiments, surveys and statistical
analysis of secondary data
Qualitative methods, such as ethnography and
case studies
No preference for a particular method− choice depends upon the
research question and the nature of the relevant entities and
causal mechanisms. Mixed methods encouraged.
8 The relationship may not be symmetric however: for example, it is possible to be a
landlord in the absence of a tenant.
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only be expected under rather special conditions − namely when the
relevant entities and mechanisms remain stable, together with the
conditions under which those mechanisms operate. The experimental
method in natural science aims to create such conditions and therefore
to isolate the operation and to identify the eﬀects of individual causal
mechanisms. But such conditions are diﬃcult to reproduce in the social
world: ﬁrst, because social entities and their associated causal proper-
ties are prone to change (e.g. people learn and change their behaviour)
and second; because the contextual conditions inﬂuencing events are
diﬃcult or impossible to control (for). Hence, regular associations be-
tween underlying causal mechanisms and particular types of event are
likely to be much less common in the social world. We may, however,
observe partial regularities over more limited periods of time (such as
the inverse relationship between the price of a good and the quantity
sold within a market) which, when present, can assist in the identiﬁ-
cation of particular causal mechanisms (Lawson, 1997; Ron, 2002;
Porpora, 2001).
These considerations lead critical realists to reject ‘positivist’ phi-
losophical frameworks that understand causality as a regular succession
of empirical events (‘if A then B’). Not only are such regularities rela-
tively uncommon (especially within the social world), reliance upon
them reduces our understanding of causality to the level of the em-
pirical, rather than the real. Causality should instead be understood as
an inherent property of entities, deriving from their internal structure
and creating a tendency to produce particular outcomes. The identiﬁ-
cation of empirical regularities (e.g. through a regression model) may
provide evidence for the operation of particular causal mechanisms in
particular circumstances, but does not explain the mechanisms in-
volved. Nor is the identiﬁcation of such regularities a necessary pre-
condition for causal explanation (although they certainly help) (Easton,
2010). Instead, qualitative research methods such as case studies and
ethnography may be more appropriate for uncovering the complex and
contingent mix of entities and mechanisms (including people's con-
scious and unconscious motivations and choices) that together explain
particular events in the social world (Danermark et al., 2001; Sayer,
1992). But while the choice of methodology will depend upon the re-
search question, in all cases the primary goal should be causal ex-
planation.
A central theme of critical realism is emergence. Entities are struc-
tured, and those structures are nested within other structures. Some of
the causal properties of entities emerge from structured relations be-
tween their constituent entities, but are not possessed those con-
stituents individually. To take the most commonly cited example, the
power of water to quench ﬁre emerges from the causal powers of hy-
drogen and oxygen, but is not reducible to them. Similarly, the power of
a landlord to extract rent from a tenant emerges from the structural
relationship between the two, and is not reducible to the characteristics
of the individuals involved.
While entities may have some properties that are simple aggrega-
tions of the properties of their constituent elements (e.g. the mass of
water is reducible to the masses of hydrogen and oxygen), the deﬁnition
of entities relies upon the existence of emergent causal properties that
in turn derive from the properties of the constituent parts and the ne-
cessary relationships between those parts. Since it not possible to explain
the causal properties of entities without reference to these internal re-
lationships, the properties belong to the entity and not solely to the
constituent parts (Elder-Vass, 2010). Critical realism is therefore critical
of reductionism in general and ‘methodological individualism’9; in the
social sciences in particular. While reductionist explanations may
sometimes be appropriate and suﬃcient, an insistence upon them
blinds the researcher to the possibility of emergent causal properties.
Critical realism further claims that emergent properties downwardly
inﬂuence entities at a lower level. So for example, in carrying out their
job, a lecturer is inﬂuenced by the rules and expectations associated
with the roles they perform within the higher-level entity of the uni-
versity.
As can be seen from the above examples, critical realism is equally
applicable to the behaviour of natural and social entities, but these also
diﬀer in important ways.10 For example, social entities (such as ﬁrms
and political parties) tend to have poorly deﬁned spatial boundaries, to
change rapidly over time and to be composed of ‘parts’ (e.g. people,
organisations) that are simultaneously members of multiple other social
entities (Elder-Vass, 2010). Furthermore, the existence of social entities
depends entirely upon the activities of the people that they govern
(Bhaskar, 2014) and those people typically have conscious or tacit
understandings of the meaning, structure and mode of functioning of
the relevant social entity, including the associated relationships, rules
and norms (Elder-Vass, 2010; Sayer, 1992; Porpora, 2015; Archer,
1995). However, both natural and social entities may constrain and
enable individual behaviour, whether or not they are recognised or
understood by those individuals.
This leads to a distinctively critical realist perspective on social
structure, although diﬀerent authors provide diﬀerent interpretations of
this term (Elder-Vass, 2010; Porpora, 2015; Archer and Elder-Vass,
2012; Archer, 1995, 2003). A common theme is that social entities have
emergent causal properties that derive from the necessary relations
between the people and artefacts of which they are comprised, but
which are mediated through individual agency (Elder-Vass, 2010).
These social relations shape but do not determine the interests, re-
sources, understandings and expectations of the constituent actors; and
thereby their actions. The resulting structured interactions give the
social entity causal powers − such as the power of a university to
award degrees, the power of an orchestra to play a symphony, or the
power of a social group to enforce a particular norm (Elder-Vass, 2010,
2016). Social entities therefore enable, constrain and motivate the ac-
tions of individuals and are in turn either reproduced or modiﬁed by
those actions. So for example, in choosing how to behave at a dinner
party, a guest will be inﬂuenced by previous and contemporaneous
exposure to other individuals who approve or disapprove of particular
behaviours, thereby encouraging them to act in ways that reproduce the
norms of social dining. Similarly, in choosing particular political stra-
tegies, a lobbyist will be inﬂuenced by the distribution of rights, ob-
ligations, interests and resources inherent in the relational structure of a
capitalist market economy, but if her strategies are successful she may
modify the structure of that economy (Porpora, 1989). Both the circle of
people committed to enforcing the norms of social dining and the ca-
pitalist market economy may be understood as social entities with
emergent causal powers − although these diﬀer widely in character
and scale (Elder-Vass, 2010, 2012b).11
· Having summarised the core elements of both the MLP and critical
realism, we can now examine the consistency between the two. This
will be achieved in two stages: ﬁrst, by examining the ontological status
of sociotechnical systems; and second, by examining the epistemological
status of knowledge claims about those systems together with the as-
sociated research methodologies. The analysis identiﬁes a number of
important tensions between assumptions made by the MLP and the
philosophy of critical realism. With regard to ontology, these tensions
relate to the ontological status of sociotechnical regimes
9 Described by Popper (Popper, 2012) as follows: "… All social phenomena, and
especially the function of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting
from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc., of human individuals, and that we should never
be satisﬁed by an explanation in terms of so-called ‘collectives…”.
10 “…… the predicates that appear in the explanation of social phenomena will be
diﬀerent from those that appear in natural scientiﬁc explanations and the procedures used
to establish them within certain vital respects be diﬀerent to (being contingent upon, and
determined by, the properties of the objects under study); but the principles that govern
their production will remain substantially the same…" (Bhaskar, 2014)
11 See Elder Vass (Elder-Vass, 2010) for an elaboration of this understanding of social
structure
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(intersubjective rules) vis-a-vis sociotechnical systems (physical arte-
facts and social relations) and the diﬃculties of attributing explanatory
priority to the former. With regard to epistemology and methodology,
these tensions relate to the use of the MLP as a ‘heuristic device’ rather
than the basis for causal explanation, the lack of attention to the ne-
cessity or contingency of diﬀerent events and causal mechanisms and
the insuﬃcient use of research methodologies that could distinguish the
necessary from the contingent. These themes are elaborated in the
following sections.
4. Sociotechnical ontology
4.1. Systems and regimes
The central constructs of the MLP are the sociotechnical regime and
the associated sociotechnical system− since niches and landscapes are
deﬁned in relation to those regimes/systems. While systems and re-
gimes are frequently conﬂated in the empirical literature, the theore-
tical literature distinguishes between them − although the precise
nature of that distinction is not always clear (e.g. Geels, 2011, 2010,
2009, 2004; Geels and Loorbach, 2010; Geels and Schot, 2010). The
most common interpretation is that the regime represents the internal
rules, norms, expectations and beliefs that guide the behaviour of dif-
ferent actors, while the system represents the external artefacts and
social organisations that work together to deliver a societal function.
“…System refers to tangible and measurable elements (such as ar-
tefacts, market shares, infrastructure, regulations, consumption
patterns, public opinion), whereas regimes refer to intangible and
underlying deep structures (such as engineering beliefs, heuristics,
rules of thumb, routines, standardised ways of doing things, policy
paradigms, visions, promises, social expectations and norms)….”
(Geels, 2011)
“… The sociotechnical regime forms the ‘deep structure’ that ac-
counts for the stability of an existing sociotechnical system. It refers
to the semi-coherent set of rules that orient and coordinate the ac-
tivities of the social groups that reproduce the various elements of
sociotechnical systems… Examples of regime rules are cognitive
routines and shared beliefs, capabilities and competencies, lifestyles
and user practices, favourable institutional arrangements and reg-
ulations, and legally binding contracts…” (Geels, 2011)
The ﬁrst quote is unsatisfactory from a critical realist perspective
since it partly deﬁnes sociotechnical systems in terms of measures of
things (e.g. market shares, public opinion) rather than constituent en-
tities (e.g. ﬁrms, institutions). The second quote is also unsatisfactory,
since it deﬁnes the structure of sociotechnical systems as residing in the
rules followed by diﬀerent actors, rather than in the relationships be-
tween the entities that comprise the system − which in turn shape
those rules (Section 3). Both quotes deﬁne sociotechnical regimes in
terms of ‘intangible’ rules, but some of these rules (e.g. legally binding
contracts, regulations) appear more tangible than others (e.g. cognitive
routines) and regulations are deﬁned as part of the system in the ﬁrst
quote and part of the regime in the second. Similar ambiguities can be
found throughout the MLP literature.
The focus on rules can be traced back to Nelson and Winter (1982)
who highlight how the cognitive routines of engineering communities
encourage incremental innovation along particular trajectories (‘tech-
nological regimes’). Rip and Kemp (1998) and Geels (2000b,c, 2004)
widen this concept to include the rules that guide the activities of the
other social groups associated with a technology − such as users,
policymakers, ﬁnanciers and suppliers− thereby renaming the concept
‘sociotechnical regimes’. Building upon Scott (1995), Geels (2004)
helpfully distinguishes between regulative, normative and cognitive
rules (Table 2) and shows how these reinforce one another. For ex-
ample, the laws regarding road use and driver behaviour reinforce the
social norms regarding considerate driving. But these rules diﬀer in
character: for example, normative rules are primarily intersubjective
and enforced through approval or disapproval by other individuals
within a ‘norm circle’ (Elder-Vass, 2010, 2012b; Archer and Elder-Vass,
2012), while regulative rules are primarily embedded in written
documents and enforced by the coercive power of the state or other
social institutions. Hence, to label all these rules as ‘intangible’ is pro-
blematic.
Further diﬃculties are created by the lack of consistency in distin-
guishing between regimes and systems. For example, in Geels (2004),
the regime is deﬁned as comprising three interlinked components,
namely:
1. physical artefacts, such as machines, materials and infrastructures;
2. social groups, such as engineers, ﬁrms, suppliers, universities, users
and policymakers; and
3. intangible rules, such as regulations, standards, cognitive routines
and social norms.
This deﬁnition eﬀectively subsumes the system within the regime. It
is not clear, therefore, whether the ‘semi-coherent set of rules’ deﬁnes a
sociotechnical regime that in turn structures a sociotechnical system, or
whether the rules form part of a sociotechnical regime that also includes
the sociotechnical system. The ﬁrst deﬁnition is more common in the
theoretical literature on the MLP (e.g. Geels, 2010), but some of the
empirical literature comes closer to the second deﬁnition − which in
turn is more consistent with critical realism. But in either case, the rules
are said to inform and coordinate the activities of diﬀerent social
groups and to explain the stability of the sociotechnical system (Geels,
2002b, 2004).
Importantly, the theoretical literature on the MLP gives explanatory
priority to the regime, rather than the system. The claim appears to be
that the rules and norms guiding diﬀerent actors explain the social and
material relations between those actors, rather than the other way
round. As Svensson and Nikoleris (2018) observe:
“… systemic elements and relations are thus deprived of autono-
mous causal powers− i.e. they are reduced to a dependent variable
− and those not internalised and recognised by agents are even
deprived of their indirect inﬂuence on transitions. According to this
conceptualisation, material artefacts and relations of the system are
excluded from structure, and exert a conditioning eﬀect only once
instantiated (tacitly or cognitively) in human agency and socio-
cognitive rules…” (Svensson and Nikoleris, 2018)
From a critical realist perspective, this is deeply problematic. First,
rules are better understood as the emergent outcome of higher-level
social entities, such as organisations, which downwardly inﬂuence the
behaviour of participating individuals. For example, the formal and
informal rules people follow within an organisation depend upon their
roles within that organisation, the relationship of these to other orga-
nisational roles and the patterns of authority and incentives that are
associated with those roles (Elder-Vass, 2010). As discussed below, this
relational conception of social structure is fundamentally diﬀerent from
that implied by the MLP. Second, the focus upon intersubjective rules
encourages a neglect of the opportunities and constraints imposed by
diﬀerential access to material resources − over and above any diﬀer-
ences in knowledge, skills and normative dispositions (Svensson and
Nikoleris, 2018). Third, the claim that rules “…account for the stability
and lock-in of sociotechnical systems…” neglects how the material
features of sociotechnical systems (e.g. long-lived, capital-intensive
infrastructure such as roads and pipelines) contribute to the inertia of
those systems and constrain the direction and speed of transitions
(Unruh, 2000). Indeed, this focus upon rules may undermine the claim
of the MLP to be ‘sociotechnical’ rather than just social:
“….The regime is still conceptualised as the rules that guide and
S. Sorrell Research Policy 47 (2018) 1267–1282
1273
orient behaviour. The addition of technology to the social system is
simply the addition of another set of rules.… In other words, the
MLP brings in a multitude of factors (technological, policy, science,
culture), but not as a conjunctive multiplicity of causes in an open
system, but as diﬀerent sets of rules which actors draw upon in
action….” (Svensson and Nikoleris, 2018)
From a critical realist perspective, it would be more plausible to
argue that the stability of sociotechnical systems derives from the ne-
cessary relations between their constituent physical artefacts, social
entities and (tangible and intangible) rules. Indeed, (Geels, 2004) pro-
vides such a framework (summarised in Table 3), even though this
appears inconsistent with the emphasis given elsewhere to the priority
of intangible rules. From a critical realist perspective, there is no need
to give the regime (deﬁned as rules) priority and to do so would be to
encourage a neglect of how physical artefacts, the distribution of re-
sources and economic and political relations shape those rules. This
points to a deeper problem with how the MLP conceptualises social
structure, explored next.
4.2. Structure and agency
In the same way that the regime concept can be traced to Nelson
and Winter, the idea that rules provide a ‘deep structure’ or ‘grammar’
for a sociotechnical system can be traced to Giddens’ structuration
theory:
“… regime rules are both medium and outcome of action (duality of
structure). On the one hand, actors enact, instantiate and draw upon
rules in concrete actions in local practices; on the other hand, rules
conﬁgure actors…” (Giddens, 1984a)
However, structuration theory has been strongly criticised by cri-
tical realists (Archer, 1982, 1995, 2003; Porpora, 1989; King, 2010;
Jessop, 2005; Layder, 1985) as part of a larger debate within sociology
about the relationship between social structure and individual agency.
This vast debate cannot be adequately covered here, but is nevertheless
critical since competing assumptions about the nature of the relation-
ship between structure and agency can lead to radically diﬀerent social
theories (Porpora, 2015, 1989). Hence, it is important to identify the
implicit assumptions about structure and agency within the MLP and
the potential consequences of these for the both the character and ex-
planatory power of the theory.
The basic diﬀerences between the critical realist and
‘structurationist’ perspectives are summarised in Table 4. For critical
realists, social structure is the necessary relations between the con-
stituent parts of a social entity, providing it with stability over time and
endowing it with emergent causal properties (Elder-Vass, 2010):
“….We are dealing with a system of interlinked components that can
only be deﬁned in terms of the interrelations of each of them in an
ongoing developmental process that generates emergent phenomena
− including those we refer to as institutional structure. Emergent
properties are therefore relational; they are not contained in the
elements themselves and could not exist apart from them…”
(Archer, 1982)
· These relations may be between the occupants of distinct social
positions which in turn deﬁne their interconnections, resources, inter-
ests and incentives (e.g. between employer and employee) (Porpora,
1989). Or they may be between groups of people with shared ex-
pectations about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in diﬀerent
situations (e.g. between cyclist and car driver). While the ﬁrst of these is
more ‘structural’, and the second more ‘cultural’, they may both be
understood as emergent properties of social entities. For example, Elder
Vass (Giddens, 1984a) uses the term ‘norm circle’ to refer to the group
of people committed to endorsing and enforcing a speciﬁc social norm.
In each case, the relevant structural relationships predate individual
action; enable, constrain and motivate (but do not determine) that ac-
tion; give predictability to that action; and are either reproduced or
transformed by that action. Critical realism therefore understands social
structure as something external to individuals and deriving from tem-
poral, spatial and intentional relations between those individuals −
along with relevant physical artefacts (Elder-Vass, 2010; Elder-Vass,
Table 2
The diﬀerent types of rules constituting a sociotechnical regime.
Source: (Geels, 2004).
Regulative Normative Cognitive
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Familiarity
Mechanisms Coercive (e.g. punishment) Normative pressure (e.g. social sanctions) Learning, imitation
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported
Examples Formal rules, laws, sanctions, protocols,
standards, procedures
Values, norms, role expectations, duty,
codes of conduct
Problem agendas, beliefs, bodies of knowledge, models of reality,
categories, classiﬁcations, search heuristics
Table 3
Sources of stability in sociotechnical systems.
Source: (Geels, 2004).
Source of stability Stabilising mechanisms
Rules Focus on particular types of engineering problem and solution; shared expectations; established roles and patterns of interaction; shared customs, values and
norms; technical standards
Social groups Interdependent relationships between diﬀerent organisations; social relations and obligations; economic interests; political lobbying activities
Physical artefacts Capital intensity and longevity of infrastructures; sunk investments; economies of scale; network externalities
Table 4
Contrasting perspectives on social structure.
Source: (Elder-Vass, 2010; Porpora, 2015).
Critical realism Structuration theory
Structure is external to agents Structure is internal to agents
Structure is the necessary, external relations
between the constituents of social entities
Structure is internal rules and
resources
Structure is objective Structure is intersubjective
Social relations are prior to rule-following Rule-following is prior to
social relations
Behaviour is structured by social relations Behaviour is structured by
culture
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2016). Both individual people and social structures have causal powers:
the ﬁrst through their agency (deployment of which requires inter-
pretation, choice and strategy) and the second through encouraging,
discouraging, enabling or constraining that agency (Jessop, 2005).
Neither can be reduced to the other.
This arguably ‘common-sense’ view of social structure is very dif-
ferent from that proposed by structuration theory. For Giddens, struc-
ture exists entirely in people's heads:
“…. Structure is….rules and resources, recursively implicated in the
reproduction of social systems. Structure only exists in memory
traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as in-
stantiated in action……” (Giddens, 1984b)
“….Structures exist in time-space only as moments recursively in-
volved in the production of social systems. Structures have only a
virtual existence….” (Giddens, 1981)
“….Structures are not the patterned social practices that make up
social systems, but the principles that pattern these practices……”
(Sewell, 1992)
“…[structure]… has no existence independent of the knowledge
that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity.”
(Giddens, 1984b)
These passages are hard to interpret, but nevertheless serve to de-
monstrate that Gidden’s interpretation of social structure is funda-
mentally diﬀerent from the critical realist interpretation. The more
conventional notion of social structure− namely relationships between
people and social groups− forms part of Giddens theory but is labelled
‘social system’ instead:
“….social systems are composed of patterns of relationships be-
tween actors or collectivities reproduced across time and space…”
(Porpora, 1989).
However, these social systems have no causal properties of their
own, but are instead ‘structured’ by the internal ‘rules and resources’ of
participating actors. Causality derives not from the relationships be-
tween individuals and organisations within the social system, but from
the repetitive rule-following behaviour of individuals. For Giddens, this
internal, subjective behaviour is causally prior to the external reality of
the social system; while for critical realists the reverse is the case
(Table 4) (Porpora, 2015, 1989). As the critical realist author Margaret
Archer argues (Archer, 2003, 1982), Giddens appears to conﬂate
structure and agency and to equate the former with social practices.
As argued above, the concept of structure as ‘internal rules’ also
underpins the MLP, whose core assumptions appears to be strongly
inﬂuenced by structuration theory. This leads directly to the distinction
between tangible sociotechnical systems (cf Giddens social system) and
intangible sociotechnical regimes (cf Giddens rules and resources), and
to the claims that regime rules: provide a ‘deep structure’ for socio-
technical systems; should be considered analytically prior to those
systems; and provide the primary source of stability for those systems.
As such, the limitations of Giddens structuration theory carry directly
over into the foundational assumptions of the MLP, leading to an
overemphasis on internal rules and an under-emphasis on external so-
cial relations.
These problems may also carry over into the empirical studies in-
formed by the MLP. For example, many of these studies have empha-
sised cultural factors such as expectations, cultural meaning and user
practices and paid less attention to physical and spatial constraints,
material interests and economic incentives. This in turn has led several
authors to criticise the MLP for its relative neglect of political power,
and to propose ways in which power relations may be better integrated
into the framework (Smith et al., 2005; Kern and Markard, 2016;
Meadowcroft, 2009; Avelino and Rotmans, 2009). Such eﬀorts could be
handicapped, however, by the neglect of social and material relations
within the foundational assumptions of the MLP, and the insistence
instead upon the primacy of internal rules (Svensson and Nikoleris,
2018). Theories of power that depend upon a relational conception of
social structure may be diﬃcult to reconcile with a theory of transitions
that depends upon an intersubjective conception of social structure −
thereby creating the risk of tensions or inconsistencies.
However, the MLP does not appear to be wedded to structuration
theory and also incorporates ideas from a range of other areas that
make diﬀerent assumptions about the relationship between structure
and agency (Geels and Schot, 2010). The ﬂexibility and malleability of
the MLP, and it's constantly evolving nature, suggests that the theore-
tical primacy given to ‘intangible’ rules may be negotiable− especially
since that primacy is not adhered to consistently within the MLP lit-
erature. In particular, many of the MLP case studies have a looser re-
lationship to structuration theory than the more theoretical papers, and
appear to give as much explanatory weight to material factors and so-
cial relations as to internal rules and norms.12It therefore appears
possible to interpret many of the MLP case studies in a way that is
consistent with a critical realist view of social structure, with its em-
phasis upon social relations and emergent causal powers. For example,
the following passage from Geels − which immediately follows a
mention of structuration theory − appears entirely compatible with a
critical realist ontology that interprets structure as external relations
rather than internal rules:
“… Human agency, strategic behaviour and struggles are important
but situated in the context of wider structures. Actors interact
(struggle, form alliances, exercise power, negotiate and cooperate)
within the constraints and opportunities of existing structures, at the
same time that they act upon and restructure those systems.
….structures not only constrain but also enable action, i.e. make it
possible by providing coordination and stability… ” (Geels, 2004)
The MLP literature is also centrally concerned with the artefactual
aspect of sociotechnical systems − something that has also been em-
phasised by critical realists (Elder-Vass, 2016; Gorski, 2016) but is
largely missing from the sociological debate on agency and structure
(including Giddens). This is crucial, since the physical constraints im-
posed by long-lived artefacts and infrastructures provide a primary
explanation for the stability and inertia of sociotechnical systems
(Table 3). This empirical focus, in turn, provides a strong motivation for
abandoning a concept of social structure that undervalues material
factors and constraints.
In addition, the MLP is continuously evolving and more recent
publications place less emphasis on structuration theory and more upon
other frameworks such as institutional theory (Fuenfschilling and
Truﬀer, 2014) and political economy (Geels, 2014). For example, Geels
and Schot (2010) note some weaknesses with structuration theory and
highlight the ‘morphogenetic approach’ developed by a leading critical
realist, Margaret Archer (1995, 2003). However, since Giddens’ inter-
pretation of social structure is incompatible with critical realism, it is
inappropriate to use the latter to ‘complement’ the former − as Geels
and Schot (2010) seek to do. Instead, what is needed is a more critical
appraisal of the underlying assumptions of the MLP and a rejection of
the confusing and unhelpful legacy of structuration theory. This in turn
requires a rejection of the explanatory primacy given to sociotechnical
regimes and a recognition that rules, social relations and material ar-
tefacts are interdependent and act in combination to give stability to a
sociotechnical system (Table 3). This leads on to an alternative, critical
realist interpretation of sociotechnical systems that rejects the distinc-
tion between systems and regimes − discussed further below.
12 In a similar manner, Giddens introduces external structural constraints into his
theoretical framework (termed ‘structural properties’), but does not label these as social
structure.
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4.3. Boundaries and properties
A critical realist interpretation of the MLP could be that socio-
technical systems constitute distinct entities, emergent from lower-level
entities and with their own causal powers and liabilities. From this
perspective, sociotechnical systems consist of multiple, lower-level en-
tities (e.g. ﬁrms, technologies, infrastructures, norm circles) that are
necessarily related in particular ways. These constituent entities, in
turn, have their own causal powers and liabilities. The relations and
interactions between these constituent entities allow the system to
function eﬀectively as a whole and provide it with causal properties
that would not exist in the absence of those relations and interactions. A
sociotechnical system therefore has properties and capabilities that
cannot be predicted from the individual behaviour of its constituent
entities, including both the stability of the system and the processes by
which it maintains that stability and resists change. Hence, explana-
tions of both stability and change that do not refer to the emergent
properties of the system are necessarily incomplete.
This critical realist interpretation of sociotechnical systems appears
broadly consistent with much of the empirical literature on the MLP.
However, adopting this interpretation still leaves some practical diﬃ-
culties.
First, sociotechnical systems have multiple properties and it is not
clear which of these should be considered emergent and which should
be considered as simply the aggregate outcome of one or more lower-
level mechanisms − such as the increasing returns of technology
adoption. For example, researchers using tools such as systems dy-
namics or agent-based modelling have shown how complex, aggregate
patterns (including highly relevant phenomena such as path depen-
dence and tipping points) may result from the interaction of constituent
entities following relatively simple rules (Sterman, 2000; Miller,
2015).13 Outcomes such as these are sometimes termed ‘pattern’
emergence to distinguish them from the ‘ontological’ emergence re-
quired for the deﬁnition of a social entity (Gorski, 2016). A key ques-
tion for the MLP therefore, is whether such ‘reductionist’ explanations
are suﬃcient to explain observed phenomena, or whether they can only
be explained by the emergent properties of a sociotechnical system. If
the former is the case, the sociotechnical system may neither be a
distinct social entity nor be required for causal explanation.
Second, for the ontological status of sociotechnical systems to be
adequately defended, it would be necessary to identify: the constituent
parts (entities) of the relevant system; the necessary relationships be-
tween those parts; the emergent causal properties of the system; the
processes through which the constituent parts and relationships produce
those causal properties; and the processes through which the system
becomes established and is maintained (Elder-Vass, 2010). This in turn
would require a clear deﬁnition of the societal function(s) that the
system fulﬁls. But such a systematic approach is challenging− and the
existing MLP literature falls short in a number of respects.
One fundamental problem is that the functional boundaries of in-
dividual sociotechnical systems, as well as the societal functions they
fulﬁl, are typically left rather vague. For example, does the car-based
transport system deliver the societal function of mobility, or car-based
mobility or accessibility to particular destinations? Both mobility and
accessibility are also delivered by other technologies and systems that
share many elements with the car-based transport system, but also
diﬀer from it in important ways. Bus transport, for example, also re-
quires a road network, together with associated rules (e.g. highway
code) and organisations (e.g. highway maintenance) and is equally
reliant upon the global oil industry and associated infrastructures, to-
gether with the knowledge and skills associated with motor
manufacturing. So should bus transport be considered as part of the
sociotechnical system of ‘automobility’, or a subsystem or a separate
system? Similarly, cycle transport shares the road network together
with the rules and norms of road use, and the latter also govern the
interactions between cars and cycles. Hence, there may be nested and
overlapping sociotechnical systems in diﬀerent areas. But the criteria
for identifying whether particular entities should be included or ex-
cluded from a system; whether particular relationships are necessary or
contingent to the functioning of that system; and whether particular
causal properties should be attributed to that system, a subset of that
system or to something else remains poorly speciﬁed. For example, the
oil industry is necessary for the functioning of car-based transport
system and is also aﬀected by actors within that system. But it is not
clear whether it should be considered part of the automobility system or
part of the broader landscape.
In a similar manner, a sociotechnical transition may transform some
parts of a system (e.g. industrial supply chains, knowledge and skills
associated with engine manufacture) while leaving many other parts
unchanged (e.g. road networks, highway codes, user practices). At the
same time, technological and social changes may drive transitions
within several systems simultaneously (e.g. the use of fuel cells for both
car and bus transport, or the use of self-driving technologies for all
forms of transport) and subsystems that are already well-established
(and hence not niche) may gradually displace ‘higher level’ systems
(e.g. mass transit displacing car travel). Similar ambiguities occur in
relation to the temporal boundaries of a sociotechnical transition. As
Genus and Coles (2008) observe, the MLP does not provide clear cri-
teria for deﬁning when a transition begins or ends, and diﬀerent studies
appear to employ diﬀerent criteria − even when studying the same
transition. While such complexity could be considered an inherent
feature of the social world, the looseness of the ‘sociotechnical system/
regime’ and ‘sociotechnical transition’ concepts make the choice of
functional, spatial and temporal boundaries appear rather arbitrary −
thereby potentially reducing the MLP’s explanatory power. This has
implications, for example, for evaluating whether properties such as
stability, resilience and inertia should be considered ‘ontologically
emergent’ properties of a sociotechnical system, or merely ‘pattern
emergent’ outcomes of a limited number of lower-level mechanisms,
such as increasing returns. If the latter is the case, the concept of a
sociotechnical system may not be necessary for causal explanation.
These ambiguities over the boundaries of sociotechnical systems −
or regimes− are further complicated by the claims that sociotechnical
regimes coordinate developments within several sub-regimes in areas
such as science, technology, industry, policy, culture and markets (see
Fig. 1) (Geels, 2002a, 2004). Rules within these sub-regimes are said to
be aligned with each other. For example, scientiﬁc and engineering
knowledge about internal combustion engines (science sub-regime) is
aligned with the rules governing the organisation of the car industry
and its associated supply chains (industry sub-regime) (Geels, 2004).
But the science, industry and other ‘sub regimes’ both extend to and
aﬀect multiple other sociotechnical regimes. Hence, there are blurred
boundaries between diﬀerent sub-regimes as well as between diﬀerent
sociotechnical regimes/systems. This creates confusion, along with the
risk that causal mechanisms will be attributed to one level or to one
regime/system, whereas in fact they belong to a diﬀerent level or re-
gime/system, or to the external landscape.
In sum, the MLP rests upon a problematic interpretation of social
structure that is inconsistent with the ontology of critical realism and
encourages a neglect of social relations, material interests and political
power. From a critical realist perspective, it would be better to drop the
distinction between systems and regimes altogether and to interpret
and explain the former as a distinct social entity with emergent causal
properties. But that still leaves a number of diﬃculties, particularly in
relation to the ambiguous temporal, spatial and functional boundaries
of sociotechnical systems and the extent to which the concept is ne-
cessary for causal explanation. The next section will investigate
13 For example, in a classic study, Schelling (Schelling, 1971) showed how extreme
levels of racial segregation could result from individuals exercising relatively ‘mild’
preferences about neighbourhood choice.
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whether there are similar tensions between the implicit epistemology of
the MLP and critical realism and whether this leads to similar diﬃ-
culties.
5. Sociotechnical epistemology and methodology
MLP case studies are complex, descriptive, qualitative and multi-
dimensional and therefore very diﬀerent from the parsimonious, com-
parative and quantitative studies that dominate in areas such as eco-
nomics. As a result the MLP provides little that would be recognised as
‘theory-testing’ by researchers from more positivist research traditions
− characterised, for example, by parsimony, a focus upon measurable
variables, a search for regularities across space and time and the use of
quantitative research methods. This leads sociotechnical ideas to be
resisted or neglected by such researchers, including many who work on
innovation. While this tension derives in part from the MLP’s focus on
highly complex processes operating at multiple levels over the long-
term, it also reﬂects more fundamental disagreements about the status
of social scientiﬁc knowledge, the processes through which such
knowledge can be produced and the criteria by which it should be
justiﬁed (i.e. epistemology). As with ontology, the implicit episte-
mology of the MLP has several aﬃnities with critical realism, since both
reject the core assumptions of positivism (Table 1). But there are also a
number of important tensions.
5.1. Heuristics and explanations
For critical realists, the objective of studying sociotechnical transi-
tions should be to explain their sequence and outcomes in terms of
complex and contingent conjunctions of social entities and their asso-
ciated causal powers (Steinmetz, 2004). This involves conceptualising
and describing the relevant entities and powers and investigating how
they combine to produce the observed outcomes (Danermark et al.,
2001).
In part, this is what MLP case studies seek to do. For example, in his
study of the transition from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles,
Geels (2005a) highlights a remarkably wide range of causal mechan-
isms including: the increasing returns from technology adoption; poli-
tical lobbying and strategic coalitions by groups with shared interests
(e.g. car, construction and cement companies); and path dependencies,
such as gasoline cars building upon the existing fuel infrastructure for
agricultural vehicles. Although these processes and mechanisms tend
towards certain outcomes, there is contingency in how, when and in
what way they combine, what the resulting outcomes are and how
external ‘landscape’ changes aﬀect those outcomes (although it is not
clear whether something like suburbanisation should be considered
part of the landscape or part of the system).
However, the MLP studies do not emphasise causal explanation in
the same way or to the same extent as critical realism. Frequently, the
MLP is described as a ‘heuristic device’ − a rather ambiguous term,
deﬁned in the dictionary of sociology as “…any procedure which in-
volves the use of an artiﬁcial construct to assist in the exploration of
social phenomena” (Scott and Marshall, 2009). An artiﬁcial construct is
not the same as the real entities and mechanisms that critical realists
seek to uncover − and this diﬀerence is reﬂected in accounts of how
the MLP is used:
“….Frameworks such as the MLP are not ‘truth machines’… instead
they are ‘heuristic devices’ that guide the analyst's attention to re-
levant questions and problems. Their appropriate application….help
the analyst ‘see’ interesting patterns and mechanisms….” (Geels,
2012)
“… [heuristic perspectives] identify the relevant variables and the
questions… All the interactions among the variables and the fra-
meworks cannot be rigorously drawn. The frameworks, however,
seek to help the analyst to better think through the problem…”
(Porter (1991), quoted in Geels (2011))
Hence, while MLP case studies identify a wide range of causal me-
chanisms, the overall framework − and thereby the core claims re-
garding the necessity of alignment between diﬀerent mechanisms −
appears very ‘loose’. One consequence of this looseness is that the MLP
is remarkably adaptable. It has been applied to historical transitions as
varied as the transition from sailing to steam ships (1780–1900) (Geels,
2004), the transformation of US factory production (1850–1930)
(Geels, 2006b) and the breakthrough of rock ‘n' roll (1930–1970)
(Geels, 2007). Similarly, emerging ‘sustainable’ niches have been con-
ceptualised as narrowly as car sharing (Ornetzeder and Rohracher,
2013) and as widely as renewable electricity (Verbong and Geels,
2007). Given the wide variations in spatial and temporal boundaries of
sociotechnical systems, the nature of the core (social or technical) in-
novations in these systems and the relevant socio-economic contexts,
one would expect these case studies to reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the nature and relative importance of diﬀerent causal mechanisms. But
the framework claims to account for them all.
When the evidence indicates the limitations of the standard ‘niche
breakthrough’ model outlined in Section 2 (Fig. 1), the MLP is modiﬁed
to accommodate: for example by postulating alternative transition
pathways (e.g. transformation, reconﬁguration, technological sub-
stitution, de-alignment/re-alignment, step-wise adjustment) (Geels,
2006b; Geels and Schot, 2007), or by highlighting variations and lin-
kages between diﬀerent spatial scales (Raven et al., 2012). Hence, the
MLP is neither compared to nor tested against other theories, but in-
stead continuously elaborated to accommodate evidence from diﬀerent
case studies. This would appear to make it closer to a heuristic device,
or to a loose organising framework, than to an explanatory theory −
with the weight of causal explanation resting instead upon ‘lower-level’
mechanisms such as learning processes and the economic decisions that
contribute to path dependence, as well as upon contingent sequences of
events. But if that is the case, it weakens the argument that a socio-
technical system should be considered an emergent and causally sig-
niﬁcant entity that ‘aligns’ diﬀerent processes, and that the interactions
between niche, regime and landscape are a necessary condition for a
transition to occur. Or more fundamentally, it weakens the argument
that causal explanation requires the concept of a sociotechnical system
at all.
5.2. Necessity and contingency
One way of understanding the MLP is to consider how it employs
the diﬀerent modes of scientiﬁc inference summarised in Table 5
(Danermark et al., 2001). Deduction and induction are the most familiar,
but are insuﬃcient for scientiﬁc practice since the former provides no
knowledge of reality beyond the initial premises and the latter provides
no knowledge of underlying structures and mechanisms. They must
therefore be supplemented by abduction and/or retroduction − which
aim to reinterpret empirical observations in the context of more general
ideas:
“…Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis
and is the only logical operation which introduces any new
idea….Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows
that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that
something may be…” (Hartshorne and Weiss, 1958)
The MLP relies primarily upon abduction− namely, reinterpreting a
set of empirical observations in the light of a particular theoretical
framework, with the aim of discovering connections and relations be-
tween those observations (Danermark et al., 2001). This is similar to a
doctor inferring the presence of the disease from a group of symptoms,
but provides no ultimate way of deciding whether the framework is
valid. While a doctor may consider several possible diseases, empirical
studies using the MLP consider only a single overarching framework, but
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with variations in the relevant processes and the way in which they
combine. Relatively little use is made of deduction or induction.
In contrast, critical realism emphasises the importance of retro-
duction − a term that, along with abduction, was ﬁrst introduced by
Pierce (Danermark et al., 2001; Hartshorne and Weiss, 1958). Although
there is considerable ambiguity in the use of these terms, their Latin
roots (ab= leading away from, retro=deliberately leading backwards)
indicate that: "… retroduction is a deliberate and recursive process
involving more than the making of an abductive inference…" (Chiasson,
2005). Within critical realism, retroduction is interpreted as: a) taking a
set of empirical observations and proposing hypothetical mechanisms
that, if they existed, would generate or cause those observations; and b)
choosing between these mechanisms (or identifying the most likely
combination of mechanisms) based on their ability to describe the ne-
cessary conditions for the observed phenomena (Bhaskar, 2014;
Mingers, 2004). Precisely how this should be done is inadequately
discussed within the critical realist literature, which tends to be much
stronger on ontology than on epistemology and methodology.14 But it
commonly involves asking ‘characteristically realist questions’ such as:
What makes X possible? What properties must exist for X to be what it
is? What does the existence of this object or practice presuppose? Could
object A exist without B? (Sayer, 1992). A key feature of this process is
the assessment of whether particular entities, mechanisms and causal
powers are necessary to explain the observations or merely contingent to
those observations (Sayer, 1992).
This emphasis on necessity and contingency appears to be lacking
within the MLP literature, which exhibits a tendency to include an in-
creasing number of mechanisms and ideas within the overarching fra-
mework (Geels, 2017). This is evident in the multiple extensions and
modiﬁcations to the MLP and in the numerous proposals for ‘enriching’
the MLP with diﬀerent theoretical ideas. The MLP began life as a highly
ambitious synthesis of evolutionary economics, science and technology
studies, structuration theory and neo-institutional theory (Geels,
2002a), but has since been supplemented (or proposed to be supple-
mented) with ideas from political economy (Smith and Stirling, 2010),
political ecology (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012), political science (Geels,
2014), reﬂexive governance (Smith and Stirling, 2007), multilevel
governance (Bulkeley et al., 2010), cultural sociology (Swidler, 1986),
discourse analysis (Geels and Verhees, 2011), geography and regional
studies (Coenen et al., 2012; Murphy, 2015; Calvert et al., 2017; Raven
et al., 2012), psychology (Bögel and Upham, 2018), social movement
theory (Elzen et al., 2011), dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997),
ambidextrous organisations (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) and nu-
merous other areas.
There are drawbacks to this trend. First, the breadth of ideas is
suﬃciently wide that only a particularly talented researcher could hope
to employ even a subset of them within a single empirical study.
Second, the ratio of theoretical propositions to available evidence is
likely to be unworkable, particularly when relying solely upon sec-
ondary data. Third, the trend to add to rather than subtract from the
framework neglects the possibility that many processes and mechan-
isms could be of secondary or no importance in particular transition
processes, and may therefore be ignored in those cases. Fourth, the
inclusion of an increasing number of theoretical ideas complicates the
validation of individual propositions. As Kirser observes: "… It is very
diﬃcult to test the validity of a narrative containing loosely connected
bits of arguments from a variety of theories…” (Kiser, 1996)
As an example, consider Geels (Geels, 2006b) account of the elec-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 Reference is commonly made to choosing between theories on the basis of their
relative ‘explanatory power’, but this criteria has proved diﬃcult to deﬁne and oper-
ationalise (Robert Isaksen, 2016). For example, Bhaskar provides the rather vague sug-
gestion that: "… A theory Tc is preferable to a theory Td… provided that Tc can explain
under its descriptions, almost all the phenomena that Td can explain under its descrip-
tions, plus some signiﬁcant phenomena that Td cannot explain.”(Bhaskar, 1975).
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integration of a series of innovations in machine tools, building mate-
rials, materials handling technologies, power generation, power dis-
tribution, lighting and other areas. As with many MLP studies, this is an
insightful, wide-ranging and richly descriptive account of multiple de-
velopments at the niche, regime and landscape levels. However, it gives
little consideration to whether particular events and processes were
necessary for the transition to occur− or why it occurred ﬁrst in the US.
For example, it could be argued that several of the highlighted devel-
opments − such as the professionalization of engineers, laissez-faire
economic policies, cultural enthusiasm for electricity, the use of electric
trams in cities, the rise of the ‘eﬃciency’ movement − were secondary
developments and hence not necessary for the transition to occur. But
Geels’ narrative provides no way of assessing the necessity or con-
tingency of those events and processes, or whether one should be
considered more important than another. In other words, instead of
seeking ways to test the relevance and importance of diﬀerent me-
chanisms and events, their importance tends to be implied by their
inclusion in the narrative. Similarly, the necessity of ‘alignment’ be-
tween all of the diﬀerent mechanisms appears as an a priori assumption
rather than a testable hypothesis.
Methods for dealing with such limitations are widely used within
the social sciences (George and Bennett, 2005), but rarely within
transition studies. One approach is to develop counterfactuals, with the
aim of assessing whether the absence or modiﬁcation of a particular
event or process would have led to a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent outcome.
Although such exercises are necessarily hypothetical, much can be
learned by systematically thinking through the theoretical and em-
pirical issues involved (Danermark et al., 2001; Griﬃn, 1993). For ex-
ample, Fearon argues that: "… the common condition of too many
variables and too few cases makes counterfactual thought experiments
necessary means for justiﬁcation of causal claims…" (Fearon, 1991) A
key diﬃculty with developing counterfactuals for MLP case studies,
however, is that causality is assumed to result from multiple mechan-
isms and events that combine in diﬀerent ways over very long periods
of time. This combination of interdependence and sequence makes
counterfactuals hard to construct (George and Bennett, 2005).
An alternative and more promising approach would be to compare
two or more case studies: for example, investigate the electriﬁcation
process in another context where particular conditions or processes
were not present or in a context where they were present but the
transition was delayed or the outcomes were diﬀerent (Fearon, 1991;
Lijphart, 1975). Although most comparative methods derive from po-
sitivist research traditions, their use is compatible with critical realism
(Lawson, 1997; Steinmetz, 2004; Griﬃn, 1993; Lawson, 2001). But
again, since the spatial and temporal scope of sociotechnical transitions
is greater than in most social scientiﬁc research, the application of
comparative methods is challenging. One could conduct cross-country
comparisons, but the number of relevant diﬀerences at the niche, re-
gime and landscape levels makes this diﬃcult.
A third approach would be to investigate the potential for agent-
based or system dynamic modelling of transition processes
(Papachristos, 2014; Safarzyńska et al., 2012; Holtz et al., 2015).
Although these are reductionist tools, they can also incorporate some of
the structural factors that enable and constrain behaviour, together
with learning processes. Hence, these could potentially deliver useful
insights into the dynamics of transitions, including whether bottom-up
processes are suﬃcient to explain at least some of the observed out-
comes. While McDowall and Geels (2017) express scepticism about the
utility of such tools for studying transitions, their argument rests in part
upon the ontological and epistemological assumptions that are criti-
cised in this paper. McDowall and Geels are correct, however, in ar-
guing that the complexity, scope, duration and multi-dimensionality of
sociotechnical transitions present a considerable challenge− and more
generally, stretches the bounds of feasible causal explanation.
5.3. Processes and narratives
Another way of understanding the MLP is to view it as a ‘process’
rather than a ‘variance’ theory (Table 6). This distinction derives from
the work of organisational theorists such as Poole et al. (2000) and
Abbott (2001):
“...There are two ways of seeing….historical processes more gen-
erally. One focuses on stochastic realisation and aims to ﬁnd causes;
the other focuses on narratives and aims to ﬁnd typical
patterns…”(Abbott, 2001)
The second of these approaches has inﬂuenced the MLP:
“….the MLP employs ‘process theory’ as explanatory style rather
than ‘variance theory’….Process theories do not explain variance in
the dependent variable as ‘caused’ by independent variables, but
instead explain outcomes in terms of event sequences and the timing
and conjunctures of event-chains….Depending on the research topic
and question, these can be micro-events such as moves and counter-
moves by actors, or they can be macro-events ….” (Geels, 2011)
Process theory sees the world as comprised of ‘entities’ that parti-
cipate in ‘events’, although the interpretation and use of these terms
diﬀers from critical realism (Poole et al., 2000; Van de Ven and Poole,
2005). Explanation then depends upon identifying critical events and
conjunctions of events. The focus is on temporal sequences − how one
event leads to and inﬂuences subsequent events. But this implies that
process theory focuses upon the empirical level rather than real struc-
tures and mechanisms. Events are relevant to causal explanation, but
for critical realists a focus upon events alone is insuﬃcient. For ex-
ample, the introduction of supportive regulations (an event) may have
accelerated the diﬀusion of cars, but to fully understand and explain
this event (why did it happen?) and its consequences (why did it have
these results?), it is necessary to dig deeper and identify the nature and
mode of operation of the underlying structures and mechanisms− such
as the motivations and resources of diﬀerent interest groups, the pro-
cesses of coalition formation and lobbying, the opportunities and con-
straints provided by the relevant political structures and the incentives
faced by decision-makers. As Lawson notes15:
“….the world is composed not only of ‘surface phenomena’ such as
skin spots, puppies turning into dogs, and relatively slow pro-
ductivity growth in the UK, but also of underlying and governing
structures and mechanisms such as … viruses, genetic codes and the
British system of industrial relations ….” (Lawson, 1997)
Table 6
Process versus variance theories.
Source: (Poole et al., 2000; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005).
Variance approach Process approach
Fixed entities with varying attributes.
Variables do the acting
Entities participate in events and change
identity over time. Actors do the acting
Attributes a single meaning over time Entities, attributes and events may
change in meaning over time
Time ordering among independent
variables is immaterial
Time ordering of events is critical
Generality depends on uniformity
across contexts (laws)
Generality depends on versatility across
cases (variations within overall patterns)
15 Similarly, Porpora observes: "… Critical realism does not completely rule out talk of
events causing other events. In the event that the baseball, ﬂying through the air, breaks a
window, it could be said that the one event caused the other. But more fundamental than
events are the ontological particulars involved….and their causal properties. It is the
hardness of the ball, its projectability, and its momentum that gives it the power to break,
and the brittleness of the window that disposes it to breaking… In each case the causal
powers of the particular derive from its essential properties which in turn derive from its
internal structure…" (Porpora, 2015).
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Indeed, despite the inﬂuence of process theory, the MLP case studies
do highlight multiple interacting causal mechanisms of this type. The
problem is more the explanatory status of these vis a vis both event
sequences and the overarching theoretical framework− with the latter
appearing to take priority over the former.
The MLP has also been termed a form of ‘narrative explanation’
(Geels, 2011; Griﬃn, 1993; Abbott, 2001; Abell, 2004) − a term used
within historical sociology that has many similarities with process
theory:
“… narrative explanations take the form of an unfolding, open-
ended story fraught with conjunctions and contingency, where what
happens, an action, in fact happens because of its order and position
in the story. Narrative therefore permits a form of sequential cau-
sation that allows for twisting, varied and heterogeneous time paths
to a particular outcome …” (Griﬃn, 1993)
Narrative explanations combine description with interpretation, but
their informality can make it very diﬃcult to assess either the sig-
niﬁcance of diﬀerent events or the comprehensiveness of the account.
This problem can be mitigated through the use of more formal tech-
niques such as event-sequence analysis (Abbott, 1995; Abbott, 1992),
but these still focus upon events rather than underlying mechanisms. An
alternative is event-structure analysis which "… forces the analyst to
replace temporal order with her or his expert judgement or knowledge
about causal connections…” (Griﬃn, 1993). However, these formal
techniques have not been applied to transition studies and the scale and
complexity of the processes involved could make this diﬃcult to do.
Instead, causality is sought in the overall ‘plot’ provided by the MLP:
“….To develop causal narratives, explanations need be guided by
‘heuristic devices’ such as conceptual frameworks that specify a
certain plot….The multi-level perspective provides such a plot for
the study of transitions.⋯Although the speciﬁc event sequences of
each (transition) are diﬀerent, process theories such as…the MLP
can claim versatility or generality when they are able to identify
recurring causal patterns….” (Geels, 2011)
“….In process theory, the generality of explanations depends upon
their versatility, the degree to which they can encompass a broad
domain of developmental patterns without modiﬁcation of their
essential character. The broader its domain (the greater the variety
of cases, contacts, events and patterns the theory can adapt to), the
more general the explanation….” (Geels and Schot, 2010)
In this formulation, the success of an empirical narrative lays not so
much in the identiﬁcation of operational causal mechanisms, but in the
extent to which it can be interpreted in the light of a highly versatile
theoretical framework that provides a ‘guiding plot’. But this provides
no conﬁdence that the plot is correct, that the narrative includes the
most important factors and events (and excludes the unimportant or
irrelevant ones), or that the causal mechanisms operating in particular
cases or at particular points in time have been adequately identiﬁed and
understood. Using versatility as a criterion for success creates the risk
that the theory simultaneously explains everything and nothing. In
practice, one would expect social entities and practices to be bounded
in space and time. Transitions entail structural changes both within and
between social entities, so the relevance and relative importance of
diﬀerent causal mechanisms may be expected to change over time and
between diﬀerent situations. Good explanations may therefore be
complex, contingent and speciﬁc, rather than universalising and the
causal importance of postulated entities such as the sociotechnical
system/regime, or particular processes such as the development of ex-
pectations, needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed.
In sum, the implicit epistemology of the MLP has more in common
with critical realism than with positivism, but there are important
tensions between the two. As with the ontological tensions discussed in
Section 4, these derive as much from the ambition of the MLP to explain
extremely complex processes that unfold over many decades as they do
from its reliance upon particular assumptions or methodological tools.
And as with the implicit ontology of the MLP, there may be suﬃcient
ﬂexibility in the framework to accommodate adjustments to make it
more compatible with critical realism.
6. Summary
This paper has sought to identify the foundational assumptions of
the MLP and to assess their consistency with critical realism. In contrast
to most studies in this area, the aim has not been to ‘enrich’ the MLP
with new theoretical ideas, or to apply the MLP to a new empirical
topic, but instead to draw attention to some of the strengths and
weaknesses of its underlying philosophical assumptions. This has been
achieved by comparing the implicit ontology and epistemology of the
MLP to that of critical realism, and by making some suggestions for
reducing the tensions between the two.
With regard to ontology, the MLP has been criticised for relying
upon a problematic conception of social structure that is inconsistent
with critical realism and which encourages a neglect of material in-
terests and political power. This has contributed to the ambiguous and
unhelpful distinction between systems and regimes and to the ques-
tionable priority given to intersubjective rules over social relations.
Progress could be made by dropping the concept of sociotechnical re-
gimes altogether and focusing solely upon the nature, structure and
properties of sociotechnical systems. This, however, would require
greater clarity about: the empirical boundaries of diﬀerent socio-
technical systems; whether particular components, relationships and
properties are necessary or contingent features of those systems; and
whether particular causal properties are emergent features of those
systems or simply the patterned outcome of ‘lower-level’ mechanisms
such as increasing returns. That clarity is lacking from much of the MLP
literature which also exhibits a tendency to assume rather than de-
monstrate that the concept of a sociotechnical regime/system is re-
quired for causal explanation.
With regard to epistemology and methodology, both the MLP and
critical realism share a rejection of the core assumptions of positivism,
including the priority given to quantitative methods. But the applica-
tion of the MLP creates a number of diﬃculties, including: a) the ten-
dency to use the framework as a heuristic device rather than the basis of
causal explanation; b) the priority given to this overarching theoretical
framework, as compared to testing competing theories or assessing the
relative importance of diﬀerent causal mechanisms; c) the lack of at-
tention to the necessity or contingency of particular mechanisms or
events; d) the reliance upon single, historical case studies with limited
use of comparative case studies or other research methods; e) the in-
ﬂuence of ‘process theory’ that emphasises empirical events rather than
underlying structures and mechanisms; and f) the scepticism towards
more ‘reductionist’ methodologies such as agent-based and systems
dynamics modelling that could potentially oﬀer useful insights into
speciﬁc transition processes.
However, the MLP is both highly ﬂexible and continuously evolving
and could therefore be modiﬁed in ways that reduce each of the above
diﬃculties. There are at least three priorities for future research:
First, reﬂect more upon the philosophical assumptions under-
pinning the MLP, rather than elaborating an already over-complex
theoretical framework. The tendency to add further dimensions and
ideas runs the risk of making the MLP unworkable, especially when
those ideas derive from contradictory philosophical traditions.
Second, shift attention away from the framework itself and towards
identifying the speciﬁc causal mechanisms that drive particular tran-
sitions. The priority should be to demonstrate the necessity or con-
tingency of speciﬁc mechanisms and events, rather than assuming that
alignment of a range of these is required for a transition to occur. The
complexity of transitions makes this very diﬃcult to do, but progress
could be made through the greater use of comparative case studies
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(either historical or contemporary) and quantitative modelling tools.
Third, drop the distinction between the systems and regimes since
this is confusing and ambiguous, is interpreted in diﬀerent ways by
diﬀerent authors and is based upon a highly questionable interpretation
of social structure that downplays the importance of physical artefacts,
material interests, economic incentives and political power. The un-
helpful distinction between system and regime is a legacy of Giddens’
structuration theory and is best abandoned. Critical realism provides a
much better understanding of social structure and allows sociotechnical
systems to be interpreted as emergent entities whose causal properties
derive from the necessary relationships between their constituent parts.
These include rules and norms (the regime), but those rules and norms
depend in turn upon material and social relations (the system). Given
this interdependence it would be more appropriate to use a single term
to refer to both.
Given the complexity of the relevant issues and the strength of ad-
herence to particular philosophical assumptions, these theoretical
suggestions are likely to encounter resistance from MLP researchers. For
example, after 15 years of arguing for the primacy of intersubjective
rules, the distinction between systems and regimes is not going to be
easily abandoned. Similarly, since the success of the MLP stems in part
from the ‘looseness’ of the overarching framework and the stimulus this
provides to new ideas, a proposal to narrow the focus could be seen as
obstructive and unhelpful. And given the complexity and temporal/
spatial scope of transition processes, both comparative case studies and
simulation modelling could prove very challenging to conduct.
Nevertheless, the philosophical assumptions underlying the MLP de-
serve to be questioned − and it is possible that the alternative, critical
realist perspective outlined here could lead to a more robust under-
standing of the nature and causes of sociotechnical transitions.
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